The Crime of Contempt of Court Should Be Approached with Caution

Photo Source／SalFalko

Recently, Prosecutor Chen Jui-jen published an op-ed arguing that enacting the crime of contempt of court has become the greatest common denominator for judicial reform issues, and urged the new legislature to enact this crime as the best first step toward judicial reform. This view is open to question. Before discussing whether this crime should be established, we must first discuss the definition of contempt of court and examine whether that definition is specific and clear. After all, criminal penalty requirements must be explicit; otherwise, it will introduce uncertainty into the interpretation and application of criminal law, leading to human rights violations.

However, the greatest difficulty in enacting the crime of contempt of court is the inability to specifically define what constitutes contempt of court. Taking the state of California in the US as an example, intentionally ignoring or failing to comply with a judge's orders in the courtroom, or deliberately offending courtroom order, all fall under the broad definition of contempt of court. Yet such a definition is far too abstract. For instance, what constitutes offending courtroom order? If making a loud uproar in court violates order, what about crying loudly? If a lawyer reprimanding a witness violates order, should a prosecutor angrily rebuking a witness be treated the same way? Since a consensus is still lacking on how to define which behavioral patterns constitute contempt of court, we should not act with excessive haste and rashly advocate for legislation.

Furthermore, there is no need to rely on the crime of contempt of court to make the public respect the courts. Even without this crime, the majority of litigants still respect judges out of fear that offending them will lead to losing their case; who would dare to show contempt for the court? As for the few who disrupt order, they are mostly serious offenders. Compared to the lengthy prison sentences they are about to face, even the punishment for contempt of court would be negligible. They will still choose to flee, collude with others, and destroy evidence, because even if they fail and are apprehended, it at most adds a few months to their existing heavy sentence. A crime of contempt of court lacking deterrent effect is a dead letter. Moreover, as long as we make good use of our country's existing regulations on detention, bail, and residency restrictions, we can effectively deal with such defendants without needing to enact this redundant crime.

Finally, the crime of contempt of court itself poses fatal constitutional controversies. Because judges act simultaneously as criminal prosecutors and adjudicators in the summary punishment proceedings for this crime, it completely subverts our country's existing adversarial system, conflicts with the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, and is evidently suspected of being unconstitutional.

From this it can be seen that if the new legislature wishes to present a sound record of judicial reform, the crime of contempt of court—which is difficult to define, lacks necessity, and is suspected of unconstitutionality—is likely not an appropriate first step.