Can the Ministry of Justice Not Translate "Justice"?

The English sign of the Ministry of Justice is "Ministry of Justice." Since "Justice" implies "正義" (justice), this ministry ought to be the "Ministry of Righteousness," administering affairs related to the state and "justice." The name "法務" (Legal Affairs) was adopted in 1980 when the separation of prosecution and adjudication was implemented, changing its name from the "Ministry of Judicial Administration."

At that time, it was an authoritarian era, and the entire state was unjust. True to its name, the Ministry of Justice probably just "managed miscellaneous chores related to the law." Expecting a small ministry under massive executive power to manifest justice would be unrealistic. Today, legal affairs have nothing to do with justice, and the Ministry of Justice itself would likely find it hard to say otherwise. However, whether its recent performance deserves the word "justice" is worth pondering.

The Zainabh Al-Hazza / Hsieh Ch'en-ying Case Recovers Some Face

The Edinburgh court in Scotland recently ruled that Hsieh Ch'en-ying should be extradited back to Taiwan, and the Ministry of Justice certainly deserves credit. However, the media's focus was on national sovereignty. Having long suffered suppression by China internationally, this ruling recognized Taiwan's judicial jurisdiction, venting a great deal of frustration for the Taiwanese people and deserving applause.

In reality, whether one has judicial jurisdiction is a "hard truth." Our country's judicial cases have never passed through the "non-free areas" of the Republic of China. Not a single judgment comes from a Chinese court (perhaps with the exception of the Tu brothers), and no legal interpretation is bound by the Supreme People's Court of China. As long as one does not split hairs over diplomatic rhetoric, resort to semantic nitpicking, or exploit loopholes, but rather acts according to the spirit of the law, recognizing our country's judicial jurisdiction is not difficult, nor does it necessarily have to touch upon the issue of sovereignty.

Furthermore, Scotland is holding an independence referendum this year, and having long debated sovereignty issues with England, it naturally has an extra layer of intuitive understanding regarding the situations of Taiwan and China. Hsieh Ch'en-ying being caught in Edinburgh is truly a predestined arrangement. Hit-and-run driving incurs responsibility, and extradition back to Taiwan to serve a sentence does not warrant sympathy.

Yet we should also think empathetically about why he claimed that "the court was influenced by the media and a four-year sentence is too heavy," and seriously review whether there is a risk of violating the "principle of a fair trial." Furthermore, if foreign courts challenge Taiwan's overcrowded detention facilities and treatment that falls short of international standards, thereby refusing extradition, the Ministry of Justice might lose face.

Accumulated Justice is Not Enough to Cover the Minister's Whole Debt

Regrettably, the image of justice accumulated piecemeal by the Ministry of Justice in the Hsieh Ch'en-ying case is clearly insufficient to offset the wholesale deficit brought by Minister Lo Ying-hsueh.

Minister Lo broke the news herself when appearing in the media, stating that after the Agency Against Corruption "finished" searching Yeh Shih-wen and Farglory Group, they called to "inform" her, and she immediately called back to report to Premier Chiang Yi-huah. When reporters subsequently asked whether the case would "develop upwards," she spoke "without reservation, telling everything she knew," saying, "Probably not!"

Huang Shih-ming's cautionary example is not far past, but clearly the lesson is not enough. The reason Huang almost faced impeachment and was found guilty in the first instance was precisely because he reported an ongoing case to someone without the power of command and supervision. This phone call from the Director-General of the Agency Against Corruption might not only ruin himself, but also place the Minister of Justice in an unjust position.

Under our country's current system, the Minister of Justice has no power of command or supervision over individual cases; for the Director-General to report a case is illegal, and for the Minister to accept the report is an abuse of power, leaving no gray area. The problem with the Director-General of the Agency Against Corruption was not whether it happened after the search was "finished" and emphasizing that it absolutely "did not involve the progress and content of the individual case investigation," but rather that "he simply should not have reported it at all!"

Similarly, the Minister of Justice must not "make irresponsible remarks" about individual cases. She cannot say that the case "will" develop upwards, nor can she say that the case "should not" develop upwards. The point is not what is said, but that "she simply must not say anything!" Rather than blindly blaming the media for exploiting loopholes and the outside world for exaggerated interpretations, it would be better to engage in introspection and seriously ponder the essence and boundaries of the Ministry of Justice as a "prosecutorial administrative organ."

Such appeals are likely falling on deaf ears. Recently, when the Control Yuan announced the property declarations of the Ministry of Justice's Minister, the outside world continuously questioned the Minister regarding her real estate holdings in Shenzhen and her fortune worth hundreds of millions of NT dollars. Yet the Minister maintained an innocent and oblivious demeanor, failing to realize at all that such actions would damage the image of the Ministry of Justice.

The Communication Security and Surveillance Act: Implementing Rules Resort to All Sorts of Tactics

Issues concerning individual cases and persons are easily highlighted and discovered, whereas legal and institutional reforms are easily overlooked. Following the wiretapping storm of the "September Political Struggle" last year, the Legislative Yuan amended and passed the Communication Security and Surveillance Act in January this year, restricting some of the powers of prosecutors and police while adding certain procedural obstacles to wiretapping.

The most astonishing first move by the Ministry of Justice was to unilaterally expand legal interpretation, asserting that although the legal amendment had been promulgated, it would not come into effect until five months later. Engaging in semantic nitpicking and exploiting every loophole, they care only about their own power rather than the spirit of the law, intending to amend the law once again within five months to seek a "comeback victory."

Little did they know that human calculations are inferior to heaven's will. After the March 18 Movement, the Legislative Yuan was occupied, and even after it resumed operations, controversial issues continued unabated. If the Ministry of Justice wants to amend the Communication Security and Surveillance Act again, it will not be its turn even if it wanted to. Seeing that the implementation date of June 29 was approaching, the Ministry of Justice seemed to be making intensive preparations, intending to minimize the "influence" of the new law through "precise" arrangements in the enforcement rules.

It is rumored that inside are a "delayed reporting clause for wiretapping in other cases" and a "solution secret for Huang Shih-ming," which not only strive to maintain the convenience for prosecutors and police in "wiretapping the people comprehensively," but also aim to pave a legal basis for Huang Shih-ming to argue in his lawsuit that "leaking secrets was for the public interest." Their mastery of manipulating the law borders on the supernatural.

Of course, the final version has not yet been released; perhaps we are simply worrying over nothing. Ultimately, whether the Ministry of Justice deserves the two characters "justice," let us wait and see.