Oversight of Nominees for President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan and for Grand Justice

Origins of the Alliance

The core purpose of drafting a constitution in a modern liberal democratic nation is to "limit government power and protect the fundamental rights of the people." Grand Justices are the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution, responsible for constitutional review and the protection of fundamental human rights, and serving as the last avenue of remedy for the people's rights—their interpretations are binding on every authority of the State and guide subsequent court decisions. A Grand Justice's own philosophy of human rights, along with their open-mindedness and familiarity with human rights issues across various fields, directly impacts whether Taiwan's society can realize the ideal of a "nation founded on human rights."

However, the current nomination process for Grand Justices is extremely opaque, and the review process has become a mere formality and overly hasty, reducing nominees who ought to enjoy the trust of the entire public to mere idle gossip among a select few.

In January 2003, six civil society organizations—the Taipei Society, the Taiwan Law Society, the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, the Taiwan Bar Association, the Taipei Bar Association, and the Judicial Reform Foundation—jointly founded the "Civic Alliance for Oversight of Judicial Yuan Grand Justice Nominees (including the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan)" (the "Grand Justices Nomination Oversight Alliance"). On April 4 of the same year, the Alliance held its first press conference, demanding that Grand Justice nominations be free of political calculation and be made after broad consultation with civil society.

The Alliance has convened evaluation meetings during successive Grand Justice nominations in 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2015, and 2023. In 2015, civil society organizations including Taiwan Democracy Watch, the Civic Alliance to Promote Constitutional Reform and the Taiwan Innocence Project joined the Alliance.

Mission of the Alliance

The Alliance was established with three core missions: 1. Monitor the President's process for nominating Grand Justices and the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan; 2. Issue the Alliance's opinions on nominees deemed unfit; and 3. Monitor the Legislative Yuan's exercise of its power of consent. In practice, this work is divided into "procedural oversight" and "substantive oversight."

Without proactively recommending specific candidates, the Alliance deems it necessary to extensively gather opinions from the public and various sectors of society to serve as a reference for the President's nominations and the Legislative Yuan's exercise of its power of consent.

Past Evaluation Reports

• 2003 Evaluation Report Finding Judicial Yuan Vice President Nominee Ch'eng Chung-mo Unfit (2003-08-17)
• 2007 Overall Evaluation Opinions of the Grand Justices Nomination Oversight Alliance (2007-09-17)
• 2008 Overall Evaluation Opinions (2008-09-30)
• 2010 Evaluation Report on Nominees for Grand Justice and for President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan (2010-10-04)
• 2016 Evaluation Report on Nominees for Grand Justice and for President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan (2016-10-12)
• 2023 2023 Evaluation Conclusions

Specific Recommendations on the Exercise of the Power of Consent

In recent years, the Alliance has revised its evaluation methods to pose public questions to nominees, allowing member organizations to voice their commentary based on issues of concern (responses from the first wave of nominees can be found via this link; responses from the second wave of nominees can be found via this link).

Regarding the Legislative Yuan's exercise of the power of consent over Grand Justice nominations, the Alliance puts forward the following specific recommendations:

1. Upon receiving the nominees' materials, each party caucus in the Legislative Yuan should form a task force to gather input and first submit written questions or requests for supplementary materials to the nominees.
2. All party caucuses should promptly schedule the review and the vote on consent, avoiding undue delay.
3. Before the Committee of the Whole Yuan convenes its review meetings, a public hearing should be held to gather broad public input, and at least one week should elapse between the public hearing and the review meetings to ensure opinions are fully consolidated.
4. The Committee of the Whole Yuan should hold at least two review meetings; legislators' questioning should focus on clarifying the nominees' philosophies and views, rather than pointless quizzing on specific statutory provisions or J.Y. Interpretation numbers.
5. When the vote is taken at the Yuan Sitting (plenary sitting), each party should allow its legislators a free vote, without imposing party discipline or other constraints, so that the most qualified people are selected to serve the nation.